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ABSTRACT: As resilience of infrastructure systems gains importance to deal with the uncertainty related 
to extreme natural events, there is increasing emphasis on the design of systems that do not fail 
catastrophically. The consequences of a perturbation on a system depend both on the magnitude of the 
perturbation and the vulnerability of the system. The assessment of the vulnerability of infrastructure 
systems presents the challenge of dealing with their complexity. This paper presents a method to identify 
the elements of a system which have the potential to trigger cascading failures thus making the system 
vulnerable. A new predictive metric (X1) is introduced and variations in the system parameters that could 
affect its predictive capabilities are explored.  Networks which have properties comparable to real-world 
infrastructures such as transportation and utility supply systems are simulated. It is found that the 
correlation between the new metric and the behaviour of the system holds across all the spectrum of the 
simulations performed. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Increasing interconnectivity between the elements 
of infrastructure systems is necessary to 
efficiently satisfy the needs of modern societies. 
Interdependent systems, however, allow damage 
to spread more widely thus increasing the severity 
of failure consequences. The existence of such 
risks has been demonstrated by events such as the 
2003 blackout in the Northeast US, where the 
damage has been estimated to be 6.4 billion USD 
(Anderson & Geckil 2003) and the 2011 eruption 
of the Eyjafjallajökull volcano, that caused a 
systemic failure in the European air transportation 
network (Wilkinson et al. 2011). It is also widely 
acknowledged that the risk landscape that needs 
to be considered when managing interdependent 
infrastructure is constantly changing. 
Urbanization is leading to concentration of 
exposure in relatively small geographical areas. 
Climate change has the potential to alter the 
distribution and the intensity of adverse weather 
events. Further, as existing infrastructure ages, 
inherent safety margins are progressively being 
eroded. 
Cost-benefit analyses and probabilistic risk 
assessments usually do not take into account 
systemic risks that arise due to the propagation of 
damage in one system to the interconnected 
systems. The exact magnitude of these effects is 
difficult to evaluate because of the complexity of 
the systems involved. In order to deal with this 
scenario of emerging systemic risks and 
uncertainty of extreme natural events, resilience 
has recently become the new safety paradigm.    
Resilience requires robustness and 
vulnerability is sufficient for a lack of robustness 
(Blockley et al 2012). A first step towards 
resilience is to assess which hazards, internal or 
external, have the potential to affect large portions 
of the system and which disturbances, on the other 
hand, can be absorbed locally. This paper 
provides a methodology to identify the inherent 
vulnerabilities of an infrastructure system so that 
the resilience plans can be devised accordingly. 
The concept of resilience and its usefulness in 
practice is reviewed in Section 2. Section 3 
summarizes the state-of-the-art on vulnerability 
research and illustrates its relation with resilience. 
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A methodology to assess the vulnerability of 
infrastructure networks towards cascading failure 
is presented in Section 4. Its performance under a 
wide range of conditions is evaluated through the 
electric power transmission system described in 
Section 5. The results are discussed in Section 6. 
2. RESILIENCE 
Resilience is often advocated as a desirable 
feature of complex systems, yet there are multiple 
and contrasting interpretations of this concept. For 
the purpose of this paper, it is taken as “the ability 
of a system, community or society exposed to 
hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate to and 
recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely 
and efficient manner, including through the 
preservation and restoration of its essential basic 
structures and functions”, as  given by the 
UNISDR (2009). This definition encourages a 
holistic view of resilience where resources are 
allocated to all the phases of the disaster 
management process. 
The first advantage with this definition of 
resilience is in the design methodology for 
protective infrastructure. Recent severe events 
such as the Tohōku Earthquake or Superstorm 
Sandy have highlighted that probabilistic 
approaches to design cannot provide all the 
answers to natural hazards. The tails of the 
statistical distributions of adverse natural events 
are affected by severe uncertainty and dealing 
with low-probability high-impact events is 
difficult. Planning for safety requires a severity 
threshold under which event probabilities can be 
modelled and protective infrastructure designed 
accordingly. Scenarios exceeding this severity 
level should be managed differently.  
The second advantage lies in the costs of 
resilience measures. State-of-the-art resilience 
frameworks (Arup & Rockefeller Foundation 
2014) include non-structural measures such as 
contingency planning, land-use regulations and 
supply chain diversification. Most of these 
interventions costs are negligible as compared to 
the upfront investments necessary to build the 
protective infrastructure required to withstand tail 
events. 
There are, however, a number of issues with 
this broad definition of resilience. The dynamics 
of the post-disaster phase is highly nonlinear and 
poorly understood. Assessing a-priori the 
recovery trajectory of a disaster-struck 
community system is a challenging task. It 
depends (a) on the behaviour of community 
members, businesses and decision-makers, (b) on 
how the system is related to the rest of the 
environment and (c) on the extent of the initial 
damage compared to the size of the system. With 
these challenges in mind, it is argued that the first 
step towards the creation of a resilient system is to 
understand where it is vulnerable. 
3. VULNERABILITY 
“Vulnerability is susceptibility to damage – 
especially where small damage leads to 
disproportionate consequences” (Blockley et al. 
2012). It derives from the internal organization of 
the system. The superposition of vulnerability 
with external hazards can give rise to negative 
consequences and a natural hazard can turn into a 
disaster.  
This definition of vulnerability echoes with 
that of systemic risk given in Lorenz et al. (2009) 
i.e. a vulnerable system presents greater risks due 
to its internal structure. Until a perturbation 
appears in the right location and with the 
appropriate intensity, such vulnerabilities may be 
latent, but the risks associated with them are 
particularly high and must be taken care of. The 
recovery from adverse events has been shown to 
strongly depend on the initial damage it causes 
(Quarantelli 1999); therefore, a vulnerable system 
is also less likely to show resilience.  
This distinction between local and systemic 
risks has also been pointed out by Taleb et al. 
(2014) when they argue that different risk 
management policies are needed to address 
different types of risks. Interconnectivity of 
infrastructures may generate systemic risks 
because failure in one part of the system has the 
potential to affect large portions of it.  
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3.1. Identifying vulnerabilities 
Spatially distributed infrastructures can be 
modelled as network of elements providing the 
support for the flow of services. Research on 
complex networks has produced a number of 
metrics that provide diverse information about a 
graph and its components. In large scale-free 
networks nodal degree (i.e. the number of links at 
a node) has been to shown be an effective way to 
identify the  elements that affect the vulnerability 
of the whole system (Albert et al. 2000), but on 
smaller networks with different topologies the 
correlation between nodal degree and system 
vulnerability is much lower (Dunn & Wilkinson 
2013). The betweenness centrality of a node (i.e. 
the number of shortest paths through it) simulates 
well the flow of commodities through a network 
but it cannot reliably predict which element, if 
removed, will trigger the most severe 
consequences (Zio & Sansavini 2010). State-of-
the-art research on spatial infrastructure networks 
uses a range of approaches and an extensive 
review is available in Ouyang (2014).  Many 
researchers use full simulation of cascading 
failure processes in order to identify the elements 
that are the root cause of the system vulnerability. 
Such simulations, however, are computationally 
intensive and a simplified approach is presented 
in the next section.  
4. METHODOLOGY 
The vulnerability assessment approach has three 
steps (i) creating a model of the infrastructure, (ii) 
initiating a local damage and (iii) identifying the 
vulnerable elements. 
4.1. Infrastructure modelling 
A well-established modelling approach for 
spatially distributed infrastructures is to integrate 
complex network theory with engineering models 
(Johansson et al. 2013). Infrastructure systems are 
modelled using graphs and a flow model of 
physical quantity is defined. A graph is a set of n 
nodes (or vertices) joined by m links (or edges). 
Nodes may represent sources (origins), sinks 
(destinations) or junctions. Links are the flow 
channels.  
Flow models of different complexity are 
possible. In this paper, the Motter and Lai (ML) 
model (Motter & Lai 2002) was used to simulate 
the distribution of flows in the system. It is a 
generic model that can be used to distribute the 
flow of a commodity or a service to the elements 
of different types of network. Two subsets of 
nodes need to be identified, generation VG and 
distribution VD, with cardinalities nG and nD 
respectively. The model assigns to each node i a 
load Li proportional to the number of shortest 
paths between each generation-to-distribution 
pair that go through it. Mathematically, 
𝐿𝑖 =
1
𝑛𝐺𝑛𝐷
∑
𝑛𝑗𝑘(𝑖)
𝑛𝑗𝑘
𝑗∈𝑉𝐺,𝑘∈𝑉𝐷   (1) 
where njk is the number of shortest paths from 
node j to node k and njk(i) is the number of those 
paths that include i.   
Once the flows through the network have 
been identified, the capacity of every node needs 
to be established. In engineering practice, the 
capacity is greater than the operating load by a 
safety margin 𝛼: 
𝐶𝑖 = (1 + 𝛼) ∗ 𝐿𝑖    (2) 
The baseline for the capacity considered in 
this work is 120% of the original load, which 
governs the state of the electric power 
transmission system used as a case study (Section 
5). The ratio between load and capacity, however, 
varies with the fluctuations in the demand as well 
as with the design standards of the system. The 
effects of variations in the capacity distribution 
are shown in Section 6.  
4.2. Disruption modelling 
Disruptions to infrastructure systems are 
modelled either by considering the physical 
nature of the threat (Dueñas-Osorio et al. 2007), 
or by considering abstract scenarios such as the 
removal of elements in the network (Agarwal et 
al. 2001). The first approach has the advantage of 
producing hazard-informed risk assessments, 
while the second investigates the vulnerability of 
systems irrespective of the nature of the external 
threat. In this paper, the latter approach is 
followed and perturbation to the system has been 
modelled by the removal of nodes.  
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When a node is removed, the flow through 
the network changes. Every node for which the 
new load exceeds the original capacity is then 
considered as failed and the process is repeated 
until there no subsequent failure. This process 
develops in discrete time steps starting with the 
removal of the test node at time t=0. For every 
time step the fraction of failed nodes is identified 
as: 
𝑋𝑡 =
𝑛𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑑(𝑡)
𝑛
     (3) 
where n is the total number of nodes. The final 
fraction of failed nodes is represented in this work 
as X∞. This has been used as a measure of 
robustness in the literature on complex networks  
(Havlin et al. 2010). If the probability of the 
removal of a network node is assumed to be the 
same for every node, then X∞ is a measure of the 
risk associated with the scenario involving the 
removal of that node.  
4.3. Vulnerability metrics 
In this paper, a new vulnerability metric, 
identified here as X1, is defined. It is the fraction 
of nodes failed after the first step (t=1) of the 
cascading process, i.e.  
𝑋1 =
𝑛𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑑(1)
𝑛
     (4) 
The computation of this metric requires to run the 
flow model once for the undisturbed network and 
once for every disruption. By avoiding the full 
cascading failure simulation, it provides a mean to 
balance result accuracy with computational effort. 
Network analysis itself is regarded as the first step 
of a more complete risk assessment process 
(Eusgeld et al. 2009), and therefore it is important 
to achieve this balance. 
Vulnerability metric X1 was used to rank 
every node in the case study and its performance 
was compared with other commonly used metrics 
in infrastructure networks research. Nodal degree 
(D), original flow through the node (F) and 
change in the efficiency of the network (E), 
computed as the change in the mean of the means 
of the shortest path lengths when the node is 
removed (Crucitti et al. 2004), are amongst the 
less computationally intensive metrics frequently 
used in the research literature.  
In this paper a complete assessment on the 
predictive capabilities of each of these metrics is 
presented. 
The cascading failure model described above 
(Equations 1 to 3) was run on the two different 
systems described in Section 5 and rankings of the 
nodes according to X∞ were obtained. This 
ranking was taken as the reference. Subsequently, 
each of the rankings according to D, F, E and X1 
was compared to the reference by using the 
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient (ρ): 
𝜌 = 1 −
6 ∑ 𝑑𝑖
2𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑛(𝑛2−1)
   (5) 
where n is the number of elements in the two 
rankings and di the difference between the 
rankings of each element according to the two 
criteria. The value of ρ can vary between -1 and 1. 
4.4. Sensitivity analysis 
In order to show the robustness of X1 for the 
identification of important nodes in the network, 
a sensitivity analysis was performed. The effects 
on the predictive capability of D, F, E and X1 were 
investigated after changing network topology, 
average link density, capacity distribution, flow 
model and network size. One thousand networks 
with different parameters were generated during 
each step of the analysis. The full cascading 
failure process was run on every sample network. 
Its nodes were ranked according to X∞ and the four 
predictive metrics, and finally Spearman’s ρ 
coefficients were calculated for each of them. 
5. CASE STUDY 
The IEEE-RTS96 power transmission system was 
used as the starting point for this study. The One 
Area network (24 nodes) as well as the Two Area 
interdependent system (48 nodes) (Grigg et al. 
1999) were considered. The Two Area system is 
obtained by joining two copies of the One Area 
system with three connecting links. This 
interdependency alters the flow through the single 
network, changing the cascading failure 
dynamics. The defining parameters of these 
systems were then perturbed during the sensitivity 
analysis to explore the performance of the 
methodology based on X1. 
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5.1. Network topology 
The first sensitivity analysis that was performed 
consisted in systematically rewiring the network 
edges in order to create new topologies. The 
average link density 𝑐 = 2𝑚/𝑛 was fixed to the 
value (2.833) of the IEEE system taken as the 
reference. This procedure generated networks 
with a fixed number of nodes and a constantly 
changing edge distribution. 
5.2. Average link density 
The second analysis consisted in sampling the 
average link density 𝑐 from a uniform distribution 
[cmin,cmax] where cmin characterizes a treelike 
network and cmax a fully connected graph. 
Networks with the original number of nodes and 
varying number of edges were generated. The line 
properties for the edges were sampled from a 
uniform distribution [xmin,xmax] where xmin and xmax 
are the minimum and maximum line impedances 
in the original network. 
5.3. Element capacity distribution 
During the previous analyses, capacity was fixed 
for every node at 120% of the initial load. The 
third sensitivity analysis sampled the capacity of 
each node from a uniform distribution. The 
extremes of the distributions are 1.05 and 2 times 
the original load, reflecting the heterogeneity 
typical of real networks. 
5.4. Flow model 
The ML model described above can produce 
cascading failure results which are similar to 
higher-fidelity engineering model. It belongs, 
however, to the class of topology-based model 
and makes only minimal use of the engineering 
information on the system. The effects on X1 of 
using a Direct Current (DC) Power Flow model 
were investigated by solving the DC power flow 
equations (Pepyne 2007) on one thousand 
different network topologies: 
𝐹 = 𝐶𝐴(𝐵)−1 𝑃   (6) 
where F is the vector of power flow in the lines, 
C is the line properties matrix, A is the edge-node 
incidence matrix, B is the bus susceptance matrix 
and P is the vector of power injections at nodes. 
For the purpose of determining the power 
injections, every generator was assumed to 
contribute to satisfying the demand on the system 
with the same proportion of its maximum 
generating capacity. 
5.5. Size of the network 
Finally, a sensitivity analysis was performed on 
the size of the network. In this case the topology 
of the Two Area network was used as the starting 
point. On this double size system the rewiring 
described in Section 5.1 was performed, with c 
equal to 2.958. 
6. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
6.1. Analysis of the IEEE Systems 
The correlation (Equation 5) between each of the 
four rankings (D, F, E and X1) and the reference 
ranking (X∞) is given in Table 1 for the two 
original networks. 
 
Table 1: Spearman’s ρ, ML flow model 
Case D F E X1
 
24 nodes 0.526 0.674 0.733 0.937 
48 nodes  0.374 0.634 0.660 0.818 
 
A drop in the predictive capabilities of the 
degree of the node is observed here, suggesting 
that the dynamics introduced by the 
interdependency links cannot be captured by such 
a simple metric.  
In both cases X1 proves to be the metric 
that is most successful in identifying the nodes 
that cause the largest cascading failures. While it 
may seem natural that the correlation is the 
highest among X1 and X∞, research papers on 
complex systems  such as critical infrastructures 
often stress their inherent unpredictability (Zio 
2014). In theory, the bulk of the damage to the 
network may happen at any stage of the process, 
and could evolve with drastically different 
dynamics. Here, however, it is shown that such 
unpredictability is bounded, and that X1 was able 
to reliably identify the system vulnerabilities 
without a full dynamic simulation during a wide 
array of simulations.  
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6.2. Sensitivity analysis results 
The value of Spearman’s ρ was calculated for 
each metric at the end of every simulation in each 
of the five sensitivity analyses. The results of the 
first 1000 simulations (random topologies with 24 
nodes and fixed link density) are plotted in Figure 
1 and Figure 2. Similar diagrams can be plotted 
for every sensitivity analysis. Instead, the mean 
values of ρ and the respective coefficient of 
variation Δρ/ρ̅ are given in Table 2 and Table 3 
for all the cases described above. The results show 
that X1 performs much better than the other 
metrics, with the sample mean of the Spearman’s 
rank correlation coefficient (?̅?) being the highest 
among the four metrics.  
 
Table 2: ?̅?, sensitivity analyses 
Case D F E X1 
Topology(24) 0.653 0.697 0.623 0.953 
Link density 0.476 0.650 0.613 0.962 
Capacity 0.449 0.701 0.635 0.953 
Flow model 0.401 0.603 0.238 0.747 
Topology(48) 0.670 0.746 0.674 0.940 
 
The coefficient of variation of each 
sample is the smallest in the case of X1, indicating 
a more robust performance. The distribution of 
the results is also is skewed to the right. 
 
Table 3: Δρ/?̅?, sensitivity analyses 
Case D F E X1 
Topology(24) 0.166 0.193 0.221 0.047 
Link density 0.416 0.217 0.221 0.040 
Capacity 0.215 0.181 0.094 0.043 
Flow model 0.482 0.290 0.875 0.231 
Topology(48) 0.119 0.105 0.131 0.043 
 
Values of ρ that allow to reject the null 
hypothesis of no correlation with a 5% level of 
significance depend on the number of elements of 
the ranking. These are: 𝜌𝑠,5 = 0.344 for 𝑛 =
24 and 𝜌𝑠,5 = 0.240 for 𝑛 = 48 . This suggests 
that each metric, to some extent, is able to identify 
criticalities. The mean values of their correlations, 
however, show considerable variation between 
different analyses. 
 
Figure 1 - Boxplot of the distributions of the 
correlation coefficient between X∞ and D, F E and X1 
(random topologies, 24 nodes c=2.583). 
 
Figure 2 - Distributions of ρ between X∞ and D, F E 
and X1 (random topologies, 24 nodes c=2.583). 
 
The mean correlation between X∞ and node 
degree (D) or change in efficiency (E) drops 
respectively by 38% and 62% when using the DC 
flow model, suggesting that these two metrics are 
the less robust in their predictive capabilities. The 
original flow (F) is comparatively stable in the 
samples considered in the analysis, with the mean 
value of ρ changing by at most 15% when using 
the DC flow model. This proves once again the 
effectiveness of the ML model in simulating the 
flows through the network.  
X1 consistently outperforms the traditional 
metrics: when the ML flow model is used, the 
ranking based on X1 has a mean Spearman 
correlation of over 94% on 4000 different 
networks with varying topology, size, average 
link density and element capacity distribution.  
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Figure 3 - Distributions of ρ between X1 and X∞ for 
the five sensitivity analyses performed: 1.topology (24 
nodes), 2.link density, 3.capacity, 4.flow model, 
5.topology (48 nodes). 
 
The distributions of ρ between X1 and X∞ 
obtained in the five sensitivity analyses are shown 
in Figure 3. The test that puts the highest amount 
of strain on the predictive capabilities of X1 is the 
change in the flow model from topological (the 
ML model) to functional (the DC model). Even in 
this case, however, X1 performs better than all the 
other indicators with a sample mean of 0.747 and 
coefficient of variation equal to 0.231. 
6.3. High risk scenarios 
The sum of the X∞ values obtained by removing 
the nodes in the top 20% of the ranking (according 
to each metric) was taken as an aggregate measure 
of the risk in those scenarios. The ratio of this 
number to the sum of X∞ in the same number of 
critical nodes identified by the full cascading 
failure model is indicated as R20. While 
Spearman’s ρ correlates pair of metrics across the 
whole ranking, R20 explores how the most severe 
scenarios identified with the simplified metrics 
correlate with the result of the full simulation.  
In other words, if the decision maker was to 
act on the top 20% elements identified with the 
simplified assessments, how much of the risk 
would be mitigated? The 20% mark was chosen 
because those few elements represent over 70% of 
the aggregated cascading failure risk. Table 4 and 
Table 5 present the results of such assessment for 
the two different flow models.  
 
Figure 4 - Evaluation of each metric on ρ and R5 (ML 
flow model, random topologies, 24 nodes) 
 
Table 4: 𝑅20̅̅ ̅̅ ̅, different flow models 
Case D F E X1 
ML model 0.749 0.803 0.740 0.911 
DC model 0.710 0.790 0.620 0.854 
 
Table 5:    
Case D F E X1 
ML model 0.166 0.193 0.221 0.047 
DC model 0.198 0.146 0.268 0.099 
 
Figure 4 shows, for the ML model, how the 
four indicators perform when evaluated 
simultaneously against ρ and R20. Metric X1 is 
again found to outperform the other metrics. 
7. CONCLUSION 
(i) Managing infrastructure systems requires to 
explicitly take into account their interconnectivity 
and the risks it carries. (ii) A new metric for 
vulnerability assessment, X1, was introduced. It 
represents the fraction of nodes failed at the first 
step of the cascading failure process. The method 
contrasts with previous research, where 
computationally intensive dynamical models 
were used. Identification of system vulnerabilities 
performed with X1 are very similar to the results 
of a full cascading failure simulation. (iii) A 
systematic evaluation of the metric X1 against 
different metrics including degree, original flow 
and change in network efficiency, clearly 
demonstrates the merits of X1. (iv) For a system 
with a large number of nodes, this metric has the 
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advantage of having a fixed computational time, 
as it does not depend on the dynamics of the 
cascading failure process. Since the number of 
such computations may be high in infrastructure 
systems, the advantage is significant. (v)  X1 is a 
good predictor of X∞ under a wide range of 
conditions. It can be used in the formulation of 
new analytical models of cascading failures of 
complex networks. 
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